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(US
Army Photo Public Domain)
3rd
Ranger Battalion loads LCIs for Anzio
In
a nation at war, teamwork by the whole people is necessary for
victory. But the issue is decided on the battlefield, toward
which all national effort leads. The country's fate lies in the
hands of its soldier citizens; in the clash of battle is found
the final test of plans, training, equipment, and-above all-the
fighting spirit of units and individuals.
Dwight
D. Eisenhower
Outside
links to Ranger recommended book lists:
Airbourne
Ranger Reading List
Ranger.org
Reading List
An
excellent comprehensive account of all six Battalions:
Rangers
In World War II
by
Ranger Robert W. Black
The Darby Foundation
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At
the end of it's small part in the Tunisian Campaign in late April
1943, the 1st Ranger Battalion entrained for Nemours, a tiny
coastal port near the Western boundary of Algeria with French
Morocco, and there, with volunteers from units then in North
Africa, formed the Third, Fourth and reconstituted First Ranger
Battalions under Colonel William Orlando Darby. The Third, cadred
by A and B of the Old First, was led by Herman Dammer who had
the legs and stamina of a Bactrian camel.
It opened Sicilian
doors for Truscott's 3rd Division from Licata West to near
Marsala. During this phase, the Battalion accounted for thrice
its numbers in enemy casualties, at small cost to itself.
At
one point, the Battalion topped a ridge to look down upon the
left flank of a medium artillery battalion firing at elements of
the Third Division. At once, the mortar squads set up and waited
for orders to fire... and waited. And the more they waited, the
more pissed off they became, having toted their abominable loads
over endless mountains in Sicilian summer heat. Finally, one of
the less-disciplined gunners let one "slip". Thereupon
the other squads loosed ranging shots also, one of which hit the
Italian artillery ammunition, detonating it with a horrendous
roar, completely destroying the enemy unit (each gunner claimed
it was "his" round that lit the dump). Shortly
afterwards, as half the battalion advanced in extended order
down a wide clear slope, an enemy convoy of trucks, cars,
armored vehicles, and motorcycles came tearing along a metaled
road which bisected the slope, and at that instant, had Rangers on
either side of it. Most of the enemy column was brought to the
ground.
Bypassing
Agrigento, the Battalion continued in extended order all
the way to Porto Empedocle, disposing of weak opposition here
and there along the way. Here it met its first German opposition
and took a hundred Germans, along with nearly a thousand Italian
prisoners. Immediately after its occupation of the port, it came
under the fire of "The Philly", the cruiser USS
Philadelphia. Spelling out "USA" and "Yank"
with barrels and bales on the docks, men of the Third coaxed
Philly's spotter plane to the surface of the harbor, where it
provided Colonel Dammer with a flight to the ship, and a
longboat full of welcome Navy chow.
After
nominal actions through Sciacia and Marsala, the Third joined
the First and Fourth for rest and refit near the small town of
Corleone which, although unknown to the Rangers then,
subsequently became known to all as the nerve center of the
Mafia.
Within
a few days, a call came to Darby from the Third Division's
General Truscott, for a battalion to secure his right flank as
he fought up the North shore towards Messina. Offered the better
rested First, Truscott demurred and specified the Third. The
battalion then, with the aid of newly issued mules, toiled over
the mountainous terrain all the way to Messina and entered that
city, among the first of the Allies to do so, beating
Montgomery, who was coming up the East shore, by a couple of
days.
Now,
it was back to Corleone, to prep for Salerno, where the Third,
as part of Ranger Force, followed the Fourth and First into the
beach at Maiori, on the extreme left flank of the main Allied
forces at Salerno. The First and Third went quickly through the
town and 12K up the road to Chiunzi Pass. The leading elements
of the First left the road two thirds of the way, to occupy the
heights dominated by Monte St. Angelo (1200m). The Third
occupied Chiunzi Pass and the ridges to either side overlooking
the main road from Naples to Salerno. The Rangers were the only
units of the invading force which attained their initial
objectives. This was because the Germans had taken over the
Italian defenses, and fiercely contested the landings, at
Salerno and Vietri sul Mare, against the U.S. Corps under
General Dawley, the British Corps under General McCreery, and
Two Commandos at Vietri. Opposition was such that, Mark Clark,
commanding General of the 5th Army, contemplated withdrawal
after the fourth day. Arguably, such may have happened except
for the highly successful Ranger operation, which interdicted
enemy travel on the principal road from Naples to Salerno.
The
first to arrive at the Pass stood on a graveled shelf, gasping
equally from the ascent and from the startling sight of a fire
pulsing high up and far away in the dark. At dawn, the fire
dims, and through the mist, a great mountain rises from the
plain. It's the massive bulk of il Vesuvio erupting fire, smoke
and ash as he's done since long before Etruscans, Greeks,
Romans, and Italians peopled his slopes, and whom he's oft
entertained with spectacular pyrotechnics. From time to time,
he's gassed, suffocated, incinerated, and buried them. On
September 9, 1943, he again has the stage! Brilliant beacon for
the Luftwaffe, Allied bombers, and aiming point for the guns of
the great fleet of warships accompanying the transports and
landing craft riding calm seas off Salerno, and about to deposit
140,000 men upon the Continent.
With
the Rangers was a unit of 4.2 Chemical mortars and both field
artillery and Naval artillery observers. With the Plain of
Naples, the main road curving along the narrow valley, through
Pagani, Nocera Inferiore, Nocera Superiore, Cava, and around the
feet of Monte Chiunzi and St. Angelo, in plain view, the Rangers
and their observers directed mortar and Naval fire upon the
roads from the first day, aided in no small measure by the
initiative of Corporal Fox. Willie, on his own initiative,
descended into Nocera, contacted demoralized Italians and
obtained maps showing significant targets for gunfire. For the
daylight hours, that road was "Closed". The Herman
Goering division, charged with that flank, tried time after time
to breach the thin Ranger lines spread over miles of ridges, but
were defeated by the stubborn defenders which included, after a
time, Paratroops and a 36th Division combat team. When the main
Allied breakout occurred, it came through the Ranger positions,
contrary to and much later than called for in the invasion plan.
The
pass included a two-story farmhouse built right into the West
wall of the Pass, with two of its exterior walls being part of
the mountain's solid limestone. It eventually proved impervious
to direct hits and sheltered quite effectively the forward HQ of
The Force, a principal OP, and the aid station attended by Doc
Shuster. Late in this action, Sergeant-Major Scotty Munro
answered the phone, "Fort Shuster!" It remains so to
those of the Third Battalion to this day.
After
rest and refit in Naples and elsewhere, the Third joined the
others, already in action on the Volturno, and against prepared
German positions in greatly advantageous defensive emplacements in
the mountains. The Rangers suffered many casualties during these
mountain advances, and in late November, were sent back to
Pozzuoli (near Naples) to refit and train for the landing at
Anzio.
In
mid-January, the Rangers landed against opposition at Anzio.
After some nine days fighting, increasing opposition on the
forward line of the beachhead, they were assembled for an
infiltration to Cisterna di Littorio. The First and Third went
through the German lines in single files on either side of the
stream in the Pontano ditch, a part of the drainage system of
the Pontine marshes which stretch northerly from Anzio to the
Alban hills. Shortly before they attained Cisterna, the First
and Third met their end, the same aided by a strange fortune!
The Pontano ditch was designated by Kesserling, the German
commander, as the dividing line between two divisions, which
arrived at the front during the evening before the Ranger
attempts on Cisterna. When the forces collided, the Rangers were
mostly in two long files, dictated by the travel up the ditch,
and had difficulty in assembling effectively. Major Alvah
Miller, the Third commander was killed with the first shot, and
the commander of the First disabled soon after. It gradually
became clear that they were surrounded by vastly superior
forces, and after a fight lasting late in the day, were finally
cut in pieces, all attempts at aid (from the Fourth Battalion
and the Third Division) failing.
Epilogue:
Revisionist historians, most in
swaddling clothes when Rangers' ramps went down, and who,
obviously plagiarizing one another, state that the Rangers were
ambushed at Cisterna. Certainly that Kraut shouting fire orders
to his battery as the Rangers stole past did not know such a
trap was to be sprung. It is safe to conclude also that the
hundreds of bivouaced Krauts just rolling out of their blankets
at the first shots, as Rangers sprang shooting from the ditch,
were ignorant of such an elaborate and clever plan. And if it
were an ambush, how come it took all day for two divisions to
cream about seven hundred? No, Carlo D'Estes got it right; the
two divisions moving in the night before, dictated the result
without any divination by the Krauts of the intended Ranger
infiltration.
Likewise,
a British writer suggests-- preposterously! Darby stopped short
of his objective-- Pagani-- at Chiunzi. The documentation shows
conclusively that Darby's assigned objectives were those reached
before daylight! To have continued to Pagani or Nocera would
have been asinine and at odds with the whole purpose of the
planned operations centered at Chiunzi Pass. Moreover, an
analysis of this writer's reasons for his conclusions
demonstrates a gross deficiency in map reading, stating critical
heights and distances (as between the Pass and Nocera, for
instance) wrongly by a factor of minus three, and quite ignores
the significance of the rugged terrain between the Pass and
Nocera demonstrated by the differences in the airline and road
distance-- one mile to 13 miles.
-Contributed
by Carl Harrison Lehmann
1st
& 3rd Battalion
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